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Politically based violence Hiustenpidennykset and terrorism is a social plague no more or less destructive than other social ailments. Instead of investing politically based violence and terrorism with civilizational and existential meanings, it is important to understand whatcreated the wave of transnational jihad, a wave that surged in the late 1990s and has recently broken into smaller and weaker ripples. While these ripples
might remain dangerous, they will most likely scatt er and dissipate. As I have tried to argue, there is a substantial disconnect between the dominant terrorism narrative based on perception which portrays al-Qaeda and others who subscribe to its ideology as a strategic, existential threat—and the reality of the threat, which is signifi cantly smaller and primarily tactical. Th is divide between perception and reality foments unnecessary fear and lubricates a costly national security-industrial complex that includes nearly a million individuals with high security clearances. Furthermore, I argue that the perception many Americans and Westerners have of al-Qaeda has taken hold of the public imagination and is not likely to change anytime soon. Evidence and reality no
Essay writing longer matt er in a world built on perception and  illusion. Every plot and incident is viewed as an affi rmation of al-Qaeda’s invincibility and reach: to the American leadership bin Laden and his successors appear to be 100 feet tall. Time and again,
stationary bike stand we are told that all plots worldwide have al-Qaeda’s signature and fingerprints. Until his death—and even after—the terrorism narrative portrayed bin Laden as a daring captain who guided his men to safety and provided them with operational direction. Before US offi cials have had time to translate and digest the “treasure trove” of documents seized at his hideout in Abbott abad, they leaked bits and pieces of information  designed to show that he was in command and control of al-Qaeda and a “driving force” behind every recent al-Qaeda plot, providing operational direction and advice to his lieutenants worldwide, and not just ideology
spa cover and inspiration. Th ere was a  concerted eff ort to underscore the significance of eliminating the head of the terrorist organization. Instead of demanding full disclosure and access to evidence and subjecting official leaks to critical scrutiny, commentators and terrorism experts repeated the charges like parrots and refrained from critically challenging the truncated official narrative. Few have
wondered whether anyone out there cared about bin Laden’s personal journal, and therefore whether—with but one courier by his side—bin Laden could have been a “driving force” behind every plot worldwide for the last five years. Americans and Westerners are fed a constant diet of catastrophic scenarios and scare tactics. Like the Cold War era, mainstream politicians and analysts neither challenge the dominant terrorism narrative nor educate the Western public about al-Qaeda’s self-limiting
challenge—more of funny t shirts a security irritant than a strategic threat. The result is that the Western public, particularly Americans, has internalized an exaggerated fear of terrorism, which has become more a state of mind than an actual reality; it shapes their view of the world and themselves. When asked in a recent poll to rate a list of countries or entities on a 1-to-10 scale based on the threat they pose to the United States,61 percent of Americans placed al-Qaeda in the 9–10 or “very high”
replica watches threat level. Nearly two-thirds of Americans consider al-Qaeda and its allies to pose the most serious security threat the United States faces, well above that from a saber-ratt ling North Korea or a fierytongued Iran. Ironically the Christian Science Monitor /TIPP poll was conducted between 29 November and 4 December 2010, shortly aft er North Korea shelled a small South Korean island off
its coast, drawing the United States into the Korean Peninsula’s heightened tensions and threatening a full-scale war. Nevertheless, al-Qaeda still topped North Korea as a strategic threat. 1 Bin Laden and Zawahiri shatt ered Westerners’ peace of mind and instilled disproportionate fear into their psyche. On this psychological level al-Qaeda has won the battle, even as they have suffered a shattering military loss. Th e fear of terrorism is much greater and more powerful than al-Qaeda’s actual numbers or capability. All the War on Terror really does is legitimize al-Qaeda’s failed treadclimber reviews   ideology and expand the  circle of enemies faced by Western and American interests worldwide. There will never be closure to the terrorism narrative as long as a few of bin Laden’s men remain alive. In contrast to conventional  warfare, it is unlikely that there will be a white flag or a surrender ceremony in the fi ght against al-Qaeda. In conventional terms, al-Qaeda cannot be defeated because it does not have an army and does not hold territory. Regardless of the death of their emir, bin Laden’s remaining followers  will carry on the losing fight. Even Obama, who had been critical of the terrorism narrative before and during his presidential campaign, felt trapped once he assumed his duties as commander in chief. Terrorism experts who advised Obama during the presidential transition scabies treatment and who afterwards fed him alarming reports about al-Qaeda’s increasing prowess and reach warned him against any shift of policy. The new strategy linked the Taliban to al-Qaeda and rejected any separation between them. Obama’s wedding rings national   security team also impressed on him the need to expand counterterrorism operations worldwide to prevent the unthinkable—the detonation of a nuclear device inside the homeland. In an early fear-riddled report, then CIA Director Michael Hayden informed the new president that clandestine, lethal counterterrorism “‘operations were active in more than 60 countries and if al Qaeda planned to detonate a nuclear weapon in an American city or launch an infl uenza pandemic by use of a biological agent, these covert actions are all you’ve really got to try to stop them,’ Hayden explained.” 2 To drive the point home to the new president, Hayden and Director of National Intelligence Blair warned that one hundred Westerners, including many with US passports or visas, were being trained in Pakistani safe havens to return to their homelands to commit high-profi le acts of terrorism: “Al Qaeda is training people in the tribal areas who, if you saw them in a visa line at Dulles, you would not recognize as potential terrorists,” Hayden said. 3 Th at warning caught Obama’s att ention. Feeling constrained,
the new president bought into the core arguments of the terrorism narrative. In an interview with investigative journalist Bob Woodward,
Obama expressed his concern that only one att ack by al-Qaeda might reinforce photocopier rental Americans’ fears and leave them with a psychological scar:
What you’ve seen is a metastasizing of Al Qaeda, where a range of loosely affi liated groups now have the capacity and the ambition to recruit and train for attacks that may not be on the scale of 9/11, but obviously can still be extraordinary . . . One man, one bomb . . . which could still have, obviously an extraordinary traumatizing eff ect on the homeland. Moreover, during an Oval Office interview with Woodward, Obama volunteered some extended thoughts on terrorism; these shed light on why the new president bought the doomsday scenarios off ered by his national security team. “‘I said very early on, as a senator, and continued to believe as a presidential candidate and
now as president, that we can absorb a terrorist att ack,’” Obama said, to Woodward’s surprise. “‘We’ll do everything that we can to
prevent it, but even a 9/11, even the biggest att ack ever, that ever took place on our soil, we absorbed it and we are stronger. This is a
strong, powerful country that we live in, and our people are incredibly resilient,’ the president stressed.” 5 Obama added that his previous thinking has now hardened in light of a greater concern: al-Qaeda’s obtaining a nuclear bomb—a game changer in strategic parlance. “‘A potential digital signage game changer would be a nuclear weapon in the hands of terrorists, blowing up a major American city. Or a weapon of mass destruction in a major American city,’” Obama told Woodward. “And so when I go down the list of things I have to worry about all the time, that is the top, Data Mining Software because that’s one area where you can’t aff ord any mistakes. And so right away, coming in, we said, how are we going to start ramping up and putt ing that at the center of a lot of our national security discussions? Making sure that occurrence, even if remote, never happens,” Obama concluded. 6 What emerges clearly from Obama’s interview with Woodward is the infl uence of the terrorism narrative on the president’s changing views of the nature of the terrorism threat during his time in offi ce. Obama once believed that the United States could withstand and weather any att ack by al-Qaeda, including the September

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There is plenty of evidence to suggest that defections, internal cleavagesand
leadership crises, military setbacks, theological assaults by leading radical clerics, as well as a sharp decline in public support among Muslims, have all sapped al-Qaeda’s strength. This should not come as a surprise to anyone. We have seen that the global or transnational jihad of the al-Qaeda variety never had a viable social constituency or a popular base of support among Arabs and Muslims replica watches. Most Muslims do not subscribe to its rhetoric and ideology and have not joined its ranks. Declining leather furniture public support in the Muslim world and the loss of legitimacy mean fewer skilled recruits and fewer shelters. As I show in this chapter, it has become clear that ordinary Muslims provide most of the intelligence about al-Qaeda suspects—a development that further illustrates the degree on which public opinion has shifted against it.There might be a time lag before these factors take their final toll on al-Qaeda; it is difficult to set a time limit. But if history  serves as a guide, revolutionary movements alienate public opinion at their own peril. Once the social foundation cracks beneath them, these movements slowly but steadily tumble into oblivion. Equally important, al-Qaeda Central has suffered a catastrophic military defeat and now, of course, the loss of its founding leader. At the height of its power in snoring chin strap the late 1990s, as we have seen, al-Qaeda comprised about 3,000 to 4,000 armed Proactol fighters. Today, its ranks have dwindled to around 300, if not fewer. According to former CIA Director and now Defence Secretary Leon Panetta a, there are probably
between 50 and 100 al-Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan. 1 But internal deliberations among US officials show that for all practical purposes there is no al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. In Obama’s Wars ,Bob Woodward baby shower cakes cites the minutes of a meeting between Vice President Joe Biden and General David McKiernan, the commander of US forces
in Afghanistan and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), that took place during Biden’s visit to the country. Biden reportedly asked McKiernan about al-Qaeda’s presence in Afghanistan.“We haven’t really seen an Arab here in a couple of years,” McKiernan replied. Biden later asked front-line soldiers about the whereabouts
of al-Qaeda, the main reason the Americans were  this country, and their responses were generally “I don’t know.” 2  Local factions that subscribe to al-Qaeda’s ideology  and tactics exist in Pakistan, Yemen, Iraq, the Maghreb, Somalia, and elsewhere, though these factions are both liabilities and assets, and more local than transnational in outlook. Most victims are thereforeMuslim civilians.

The material links and  connections between local branches and al-Qaeda are tenuous at best.Only
al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (known as the  Yemen based branch “AQAP”) has shown any determination to plot attacks against the US homeland. In addition to the foiled ink bomb plot, AQAP succeeded in co-opting and arming a self-radicalized freelancer—the  aforementioned Christmas Day bomber allowing bin Laden to claim responsibility for the failed bombing. Senior officials of the Obama administration also accused the Pakistani Taliban (known sole f80 as Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, or TT P) of joining
forces with al-Qaeda—some of whose senior sole f63 leaders it may be hiding—and of facilitating, directing, and probably financing the failed car bombing in Times Square.
Local factions give a false impression that al-Qaeda Central possesses the reach and capability to wage a borderless, global war despite exercising little operational control  African Mango over them. They are nonetheless a force multiplier, a kind of strategic reserve, and an effective public relations tool that reaffirms the existence and relevance of al-Qaeda’s transnational jihad. In Yemen,  Somalia, and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM),
these local factions seem to have given the organization a new lease on life. That lease is extremely tenuous and limited, yet its very existence reinforces widely held Western  perceptions, or misperceptions of al-Qaeda’s omnipotence, once again reinforcing the terrorism narrative and creating an overreaction. Moreover, these local factions are not an extension of al-Qaeda Central. They might  share a similar ideological worldview, a similar rhetoric, and sometimes plot attacks against Western targets, but they are intensely local and dedicated to the overthrow of “renegade” Arab and Muslim rulers rather than external enemies. They would fight on both fronts if they could, but they cannot; when they do, they face an avalanche of internal  and external resistance that puts their very survival at risk. AQAP currently numbers between 50 and 300 core operatives in Yemen—as many as those in Pakistan, though they are younger and greener and lack the operational skills and training of members of al-Qaeda Central. Most are rookies with little combat experience. As I learned in my interviews with a dozen or so Yemeni al-Qaeda members in 2007 and 2008, most are only semi-literate and disfranchised; they lack the knowledge and sophistication of their
predecessor generation, which fought inAfghanistan. AQAP is something of a shadowy fringe group with no mass following. Nevertheless, led by Nasser al-Wahishi, a former private secretary to bin Laden and a disciplined and experienced operative, and by its military commander, Qassim al-Raymi, this Yemeni branch of al-Qaeda has become more organized and coherent. its recent resurgence—that lease on life I mentioned—is closely linked to deteriorating social, economic, and political conditions in this benighted Arab country, as well as the dismantling of its neighbouring Saudi group. Indeed AQAP was formed by a 2009 merger between the Saudi and Yemeni branches. The arrival of t shirt printing approximately two dozen seasoned and skilled fighters fleeing the lost cause in Saudi
Arabia, some of whom had fought in Iraq and Afghanistan, provided operational  expertise (for example, in bomb-making and media outreach) and a sense of purpose and initiative. For example, Ibrahim Hassan al-Asiri, a Saudi operator of AQAP who
studied steriods chemistry at King  Saud  University,is believed to be the top technical expert and bomb-maker. American intelligence officials pokies assert that  he designed the foiled mail bombs in October 2010, as well as the underwear explosives. Asiri, the son of a Saudi military officer who grew up in Riyadh, is also suspected of having pokies designed the body cavity bomb that killed his younger brother, Abdullah al- Asiri, in a failed attempt last year to assassinate Prince Muhammad bin Nayef, the top Saudi counterterrorism official. 4 The case of Ibrahim al-Asiri—who pokies never made it to Afghanistan or raq and who acquired his bomb-making skills after he had joined AQAP—shows how one  technical expert can serve as a force multiplier in a small group. He thrust AQAP into the spotlight and has rattled Obama’s national security team. AQAP has also gained notoriety because of Anwar al-Awlaki, a Yemeni-American cleric who received a great deal of media coverage for his purported ability to influence young Muslims living in Western societies, such as the Christmas Day bomber and the US army major who shot thirteen of his comrades in Fort Hood, Texas.

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Despite that coverage Awlaki is unknown in Yemen and neighboring countries, and his importance is overblown by Washington—theObama administration designated him as a legitimate target for assassination in April 2010. He does not possess any social constituency either inside or outside Yemen. Despite a concerted campaign by the Yemeni authorities and the US military to destroy AQAP, the results have been mixed. Beginning in June 2010 AQAP carried out total gym xls several att acks on security facilities in the south, killing about 100 members of the army and security forces and injuring many others. In one particular attack on June 19, 2010, AQAP displayed operational boldness and sophistication by launching simultaneous and coordinated raids on a Yemeni intelligence headquarters in Aden, freeing prisoners and killing eleven people; it also att acked two police stations in Zinjibar, killing three officers.  Attacking security personnel and  government officials represents a radical departure for al-Qaeda. After an American strike thatkilled Yemeni civilians and children in December 2009, its operators joined a protest rally broadcast live on Al Jazeera, in which a speaker, shouldering an AK-47 rifle, appealed to Yemeni counter terrorism officers: “Soldiers, you should know we do not want to fight you!” he shouted. “There is no issue between you and us. The issue is between us and America and its agents. Beware quick payday loans taking the side of America.” For a brief moment, AQAP seemed to have learned from al-Qaeda’s past, avoiding the trap of attacking the near enemy. Since the founding of AQAP, Wahishi and Raymi struggled to appeal to the people of Yemen, especially to the tribes that off ered them shelter and protection, using an Internet magazine, videos, and interviews with local journalists. Th ey encouraged al-Qaeda members to marry tribal women and mediated tribal disputes. In early 2007, Zawahiri issued an audiotape addressed to “the noble and defiant tribes of Yemen,” urging them to imitate the defi ant Afghan Pashtun and Baluch  tribes and to “support your mujahideen brothers.” Al-Qaeda learned a painful lesson in Iraq, that public support among Muslims, especially those of the dominant tribes, is vital to survival. That moment did not last long. Marking a recent shift in its tactics, AQAP has declared all-out war against what it called the “tyrant” government of President Saleh and its soldiers “who theorize Muslims, support the crusade against our country, and are the first line of American defense in Yemen.”8 In an audio message made in August 2010, AQAP also threatened to overthrow the Saudi monarchy “for its participation in the US-led crusade against Islam,” and called on Saudi armed forces to att ack Israel. Now the al-Qaeda branch is waging a hit-and-run guerrilla insurgency campaign against the very Yemeni officers against whom it had vowed not to fight. In an audio message, al-Qaeda military commander Raymi declared his intent to establish the so-called Aden-Abyan Islamic Army (AAIA), a militia that aims to  overthrow the Saleh regime—a tall order and one fraught with hubris, but nevertheless revealing of al-Qaeda’s new tactics.

Regardless of how al-Qaeda rationalizes it, the bloodletting is bound to turn ordinary Yemenis against them. Killing Yemeni soldiers will not endear AQAP to the people nor empower it. Once al-Qaeda’s presence becomes too costly for its tribal hosts, it will not be welcome there. There  is increasing evidence that in the Shabwa province the situation between the tribes and al-Qaeda is “tense.” Al-Qaeda operators were forced to leave some villages and flee to the mountains after locals became weary of their presence and the unwanted attention and risk they had brought. Nevertheless the growing brazenness and activism of al-Qaeda’s Yemen branch and how this relates to the country’s problems—deepening social and political crises, lawless tribes, and sclerotic state institutions—is alarming. For example, AQAP manipulates and leverages its tribal connections in the south to gain a foothold in the rising secessionist movement there. Th is strategy comes at a critical
time in Yemen, a country engulfed in social and revolutionary upheaval

designed to topple its ruling autocrat, currently being treated in a military hospital in Saudi Arabia for wounds sustained in an assassination attempt on his life on June 3, and ansition to a more representative government. A separatist movement with a sizable segment of public opinion has gained momentum in the south, demanding a divorce

from the union imposed by the north in the early 1990s. Jihadist chiefs, such as Khalid Abd al-Nabi, who in 1994 joined the Saleh government and battled the Socialists, have now turned against their former allies and directly support the secessionist forces in southern Yemen. Although  Abd al-Nabi’s goal is to establish a sharia-based state in southern Yemen, he is willing to ally himself with the devil—southern nationalists and Socialists—to defeat a greater evil, the Saleh regime. He travels widely  and with impunity, along with a large armed escort. Th e al-Qaeda Yemen branch has tried to embed itself in these raging internal conflicts—particularly in the south, as mentioned,and mainly in the Shabwa and adjacent Abyan provinces, and the Marib province, east of Yemen’s capital—and to position itself as the spearhead of opposition and armed resistance to the weak and hated central government in Sana’a. Since August 2010, harman kardon soundsticks ii government forces have batt  led the opposition and al-Qaeda elements to regain control over the city of foudar in Abyan province; they have left dozens of dead in both camps and forced thousands from their homes.Examining statements by the authorities and the rebels, it is difficult to tell whether the government is confronting only the secessionists, the jihadis, or both, though the separatists have denied joining forces with jihadis.

 Yemeni reporters in Abyan say that separatists and jihadis cooperate indirectly, facilitating each other’s attacks against security Bose Companion 3 forces despite their ideological differences. Yemen is a fragile state whose institutions have nearly reached their breaking point. In addition to the secessionist movement in the south, a rebellion in the north between the government and the Houthis has raged off and on since 2004, a confl ict that has killed thousands and displaced hundreds of thousands. Feuding tribes—some abetted by the authorities—have taken their toll on the central government’s logitech z-5500
authority and credibility. The social and political upheaval is driven by the same reasons as in the south: economic grievances, massive unemployment, abject poverty, declining oil revenues, pervasive corruption, unsustainable water consumption, an incompetent bureaucracy, and a closed authoritarian politicalsystem. Al-Qaeda has found a fertile ground in the south in particular, because it has a large population of unemployed young men who are angry at the government’s broken promises. In my interviews with these young Yemenis in the period since 2007, many have told me that they were drawn to al-Qaeda because of its radical allure and defi ant rhetoric, and because the protracted autocratic system had failed them, abandoning them to a bleak life in the desert. logitech z-2300 Statistics do not convey the extent of the social and economic misery in Yemen. Almost 40 percent of the country’s 23 million people are unemployed. More than a third of the population is undernourished, and almost 50 percent live in abject poverty. Though it is the poorest Arab country, Yemen has one of the highest fertility rates in the region—upward of 3.7 percent. This means that today 60 percent of the population is under the age of 20. And while the population has increased at a very fast pace, resources have declined at an even faster rate. In the next few years, Yemen’s oil—its major source of hard currency—will meet only the country’s domestic consumption needs. Despite pledges of support by Yemen’s oil-producing Gulf neighbors and the international community, litt le progress has been achieved on the social and economic fronts. Less than 10 percent of the aid pledged by regional and international donors has been delivered to Yemen, because of the country’s weak infrastructure and donor fatigue, and thus the living conditions for the majority of the Yemeni population continue to deteriorate. The logitech x-540 Saleh government—for that’s what it still is—can no longer deliver social goods and patronage, historically the underpinnings of his rule, or manipulate tribal disputes that allow it to maintain an upper hand. Aft er more than three decades in power, Saleh’s ability to co-opt adversaries and maintain friends has shrunk considerably.

US diplomatic cables leaked through WikiLeaks show a calculated effort by Saleh to use the country’s daunting challenges as a kind of threat to coax the Americans into providing more aid. In a meeting with John Brennan in September 2009, Saleh pressed the American envoy to offer “deeds, not only words,” to help ameliorate Yemen’ssocial, economic, and political crisis. “Referencing the high poverty rate and illicit arms fl ow into both Yemen and Somalia, Saleh concluded by saying, ‘if you don’t help, this country will become worse than Somalia,’” reported the American ambassador, Stephen A. Seche, who attended the meeting. Given Yemen’s weakening institutions, the status quo is unsustainable. The powerful democratic wave that shook the very foundation of  Arab countries in 2011 threatens to end Saleh’s 31 year rule. It is not only the survival of his regime at stake, but also the survival of the Yemeni state as a whole. Despite an effort to appoint himself president for life, Saleh said he would neither seek reelection nor hand over authority to his son once his current term ends in 2013. “No extension, no inheritance, no resetting the clock,” Saleh stated. But those concessions failed to quell a widespread public revolution and a concerted eff ort to get rid of him following the ouster of Egyptian President Mubarak.

This grim scenario, however, does not mean that Yemen will disintegrate in the way that Somalia did, and hence risk becoming dominated by al-Qaeda. Despite the country’s myriad problems, a frequent visitor to Yemen recognizes that the state still guides ordinary peoples’ daily lives, either in the form of jobs, subsistence, health, education, or patronage. Although the government’s resources have declined, it still provides employment and status (though with sometimes meager salaries) to many tribes, securing the state’s hold over society. Saudi Arabia’s money and patronage sustain infl uential tribes and give them a stake in the existing order, as well as an incentive to prevent al-Qaeda from gaining a foothold. Th e problem is that by giving fi nancial support directly to the tribes, the Saudis further weaken the hold and reach of the central government.

If Saleh does not step down, Yemen will very likely plunge into all-out civil war, a scenario which perfectly suits AQAP’s purposes. As Saleh recovers from his wounds, fighting between his loyalist troops and tribal opponents rages in the capital and some of the provinces. AQAP has already exploited the escalating violence to spread its tentacles, particularly in the restive south. Should Saleh return to Yemen, as his close aides say he will, Yemen would face a grim future. Nevertheless, again, it is misleading to simplify Yemen’s challenges or to portray it as a new headquarters of al-Qaeda and therefore of transnational jihad. Although AQAP is extremely dangerous—as shown by its off ensive against the Yemeni authorities, the failed underwear bomber.

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It does not possess the material, human means, or endurance to sustain a transnational campaign, nor does it have the assets or resources to build viable alliances with Yemeni tribes and a social welfare infrastructure. In fact, AQAP is inherently dependent on the generosity and protection of tribes that are notorious for their shift ing loyalties and llegiances. Tribal conduct is governed by pragmatism and survival in a harsh environment rather than by ideology. By the end of 2010, Awlaki’s own tribe, together with more powerful tribes, reached a deal with the government to chase AQAP operators from its neighborhood. Now  AQAP is militarily confronting the authorities and Western powers, a risky venture that will most likely degrade its capability. Regarding the Christmas Day att empt, President Obama said the Nigerian suspect had acted under orders from the al-Qaeda branch in Yemen, which “trained him, equipped him with those explosives and directed him to att ack” the United States. Vowing to hold accountable all those involved, Obama sent a lett er to Saleh, delivered by none other than General Petraeus, then head of the US Central Command, in which he pledged to double the $70 million in counterterrorism aid to the poverty-stricken country in 2009, a figure that does not include covert programs run by American special forces and the CIA.

According to the American ambassador (as revealed in a leaked cable), although Saleh rejected General Petraeus’s proposal to send US advisers along on Yemeni  unterterrorism operations, he did not have any objection to that of moving away from the use of cruise missiles and instead allowing US fixed-wing bombers to circle outsideYemeni territory, “out of sight,” and engage AQAP targets when actionable intelligence became available. The United States has already ramped up counterterrorism

assistance to Yemen to $155 million in fi scal year as Pakistan, a clear indication that the United States perceives AQAP as an increasing and “very serious threat,” according to Mike Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff .Indeed, CIA analysts reportedly see al-Qaeda as a greater threat in Yemen than in Pakistan.Before the failed Christmas Day bombing in 2009, the Obama administration had escalated its military operations in Yemen and since that time it has carried out at least four missile and air strikes in the mountains and deserts of the country, killing dozens of civilians along with a few alleged militants. There are some doubts as to how effective these attacks are. For example, in December 2009, a US Navy ship off the coast of Yemen fired a double cruise missile, according to a report byAmnesty International, hitting what was supposed to be an al-Qaeda training camp in the southern Abyan province. The first report from the Yemeni government claimed that its air force had killed “around 34” al-Qaeda fi ghters there and that others had been captured elsewhere

in coordinated ground operations. The next day, Obama called Saleh to thank him for his cooperation and to pledge continuing American support, then he sent General petraeus to Yemen to deliver personally to Saleh a package of enhanced counterterrorism and security assistance. In the meeting with Petraeus mentioned previously, while Saleh

praised the December strikes, he said that “mistakes were made” in the killing of civilians, according to leaked American diplomatic cables. Saleh lamentedthe use of cruise issiles that are “not very accurate” and welcomed the use of aircraft -deployed, precisionguided bombs instead. Having publicly claimed that they were Yemeni strikes, Saleh’s major concern was to keep up the ruse and  prevent public backlash at home.“We’ll continue saying the bombs are ours, not yours,” Saleh told Petraeus. The Yemeni press quickly identified the Americans as responsible for the attack; Yemenis gathered to express their outrage. Al-Qaeda joined the rally and tried to capitalize on public anger. An

inquiry by the Yemeni parliament found that the strike had  killed at least forty-one members of the Haydara family in one of two Bedouin encampments living near the makeshift al-Qaeda tent. Three more civilians were killed and nine were wounded four days later when they stepped on unexploded munitions from the missile. According to an investigation by Amnesty International, the missile had been loaded with cluster bombs, which disperse small munitions,some of which do not immediately explode, increasing the likelihood of civilian  casualties. Human rights groups condemn their use.

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